Should Massachusetts Regionalize Public Health? by Hayden, Eric W.
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Financial Services Forum Publications Financial Services Forum
6-1-2007
Should Massachusetts Regionalize Public Health?
Eric W. Hayden
University of Massachusetts Boston, eric.hayden@umb.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/financialforum_pubs
Part of the Business Commons, and the Public Health Commons
This Occasional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Financial Services Forum at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Financial Services Forum Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hayden, Eric W., "Should Massachusetts Regionalize Public Health?" (2007). Financial Services Forum Publications. Paper 16.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/financialforum_pubs/16
 









































DRAFT: Not for quotation or attribution without the author’s permission 
                                                                                                4-11-07 
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Abstract: 
Amidst rising global concerns about bioterrorism and pandemic flu preparedness, 
the delivery capacity and effectiveness of public health service assume  increased 
importance and relevance.  In the United States, the lack of a centr lized, national 
public health system has meant that “public health” is the primary responsibility 
of state and local governments.  Many states have established various types of 
intrastate regional structures to deliver the range of on-goi g, ccasional, and/or 
episodic services that characterize the world of public health.  However, 
Massachusetts is not among them.  Despite its global reputation as a pre-eminent 
medical center, the state of Massachusetts has a highly balkanized public health 
system, with a separate health department for each of its 351 cities and towns.  
This structure reflects the state’s long-standing tradition of weak county 
government and strong home rule.  The result, however, is a state-wide public 
health system characterized by strong local autonomy, lack of accountability, no 
credentialing or licensure requirements, disparate delivery capabilities, increased 
funding problems, and the real potential for ineffectiveness in the event of a 
devastating disease or attack.  This paper examines how public hea th is currently 
organized and delivered both nationally and within Massachusetts, and it 
concludes by identifying criteria and potential regionalization structures that could 
lead to a more efficient and comprehensive public health delivery capability for 
the state.  The findings have relevance not only for Massachuetts but also any 




Introduction:                                                  
Massachusetts is a world renowned center of medical excellence, the home of world-class 
training, delivery and research systems like Harvard University Medical School, the 
Massachusetts General Hospital, and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute.  However, the 
state’s reputation as a “Medical Mecca” stems more from its success in treating and 
curing disease rather than in preventing disease and protecting its populace from threats 
to health and safety.  In the United States, 99% of healthcare dollars are spent on the 
former, and only 1% on the latter.  It is the latter  -the treatment of the broad community 
rather than the individual-  which comprises what is traditionally known as “public 
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Amidst rising global concerns about preparedness for bioterrorism, pandemics, and 
natural disasters, the delivery capacity of public health services assumes increased 
importance world-wide.  As demands and expectations rise, one can reasonably question 
whether Massachusetts’s current public health mosaic  -351 separate local health 
departments, one for each of its cities and towns  -offers the best infrastructure for 
providing the range of on-going, occasional, and/or episodic services that characterize the 
world of public health.   Each of these separate healt  departments is, at least in theory, 
responsible for delivering the same set of services whether to Boston (population 
approaching 600,000) or Monroe, a town of about 100 in the state’s rural west. The 
reality is quite different, as the larger municipalties generally meet most of their 
responsibilities while scores of small towns throughout the rest of the state provide only 
minimal services.   
 
Is there a better way?   
 
In the wake of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), most sta es  -including Massachusetts-  have 
established intrastate regional structures to manage and disperse federal emergency 
preparedness funds.  Could Massachusetts use this (or a similar) model as the basis for  
re-structuring its public health delivery system into one that fosters the operating and 
financial synergies available through multi-community collaborations?  Might the public 
health needs of the state’s 6.5 million residents be more effectively and efficiently 
managed through, for example, a dozen or so regions rather than the current 351 separate 
local departments?                       
 
Public health is not the only sector in Massachusetts where some form of regionalization 
could facilitate synergies and cost savings.  In its waning months, the Romney 
administration began to push incentives to get small school districts to consolidate rather 
than waste millions of tax payer dollars running their own separate, localized operations.  
In the early months of the successor Patrick administrat on, there is some dialogue about 
potential gains to be realized by a more regional approach to municipal services  -for 
example, combining the health insurance and/or pension management of  towns as a 
means of taking advantage of group discounts and/or efficiencies of scale.  Including the 
delivery of public health in this discussion deserves serious consideration.   
  
As a means of fostering such a dialogue, this paper examines how public health is 
currently organized and delivered both nationally and within Massachusetts, and it then 
identifies alternative regionalization options that might improve the ability of 
Massachusetts to respond to a major public health emergency.  The implications could be 
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significant not only for Massachusetts but also other states with town-based public health 




The U.S. Public Health Structure: 
Through the Tenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution reserves to the individual states all 
powers not otherwise either specifically given to the federal government (e.g., defense, 
foreign diplomacy) or specifically denied the states ( .g., coining money, taxing imports 
and exports).   Retained by every state is the sovereign power to promote and protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of its people.  From the nation’s very beginning, the individual 
states have used this power to develop necessary structures and organizations to prevent 
epidemics and communicable diseases, to protect citizens from environmental hazards 
and personal injury, to respond to health emergencies and disasters, and to promote 
healthy behaviors.  While the federal public health presence has grown considerably over 
the years   -for example, through the creation of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in 1946, Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, and most recently the Department 
of Homeland Security-   each state remains the primary bastion for protecting its citizens 
from both acute and chronic threats to the public healt .  State laws, local ordinances and 
regulations, licenses, and inspections are the legal me ns of implementation.      
 
States carry out their range of public health functions through a wide variety of different 
organizational structures, programs and services, staffing levels, and reporting 
relationships.  Ultimately, however, each state has an identifiable lead agency (e.g., 
Department of Public Health) with overall public health responsibility.  In about two-
thirds of the states, that lead agency is free-standing and reports to the governor; in the 
rest, it is part of a multipurpose health and/or human services agency. 1  
 
The front line of public health delivery is the local health department, or LHD.  Most  
people know their LHD as the local entity that, among ther things, provides both 
preventative health interventions (e.g., immunizations, screenings for such maladies as 
tuberculosis or high blood pressure, tobacco use prevention programs, school health 
programs, and mental health services) and environmental protection services (e.g., 
restaurant inspections and regulation, septic inspections, water and milk safety, and/or air 
pollution, insect, and rodent controls).      
 
Nation-wide, there are some 3,000 LHDs.  These are often  -but certainly not always-  
staffed by individuals with formal training in public health or medicine.  LHDs operate in 
every state but Rhode Island.  They typically report to a local board of health, whose 
members are usually appointed; less frequently, board members are elected by the public, 
either to serve in this specific capacity or by virtue of having been elected to some other 
position, such as a town selectman or member of the county council.  In those instances 
where the local board of health functions in more of an advisory (as opposed to 
supervisory) capacity, the LHD reports to other parts of local or state government (for 
example, the state health director, a country commissioner or executive, the city council, 
or a town manager). 2     
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Absent specific and consistent standards to guide their performance, the delivery capacity 
of LHDs varies widely among communities.  Reflecting the geopolitical and socio-
economic diversity of the areas they serve, LHDs run the gamut from comprehensive, 
well-funded metropolitan operations dealing with hundreds of thousands (or even 
millions) of citizens to barely functioning rural units serving a few hundred people.  
Those that are unable to perform all public health functions on their own find other 
means of accomplishing their tasks -for example, by turning to their state for help in 
carrying out some functions and/or by partnering with local community organizations 
(e.g., public or private health care providers, schools, businesses, media, and law 
enforcement or public safety entities) or neighboring LHDs.  At times, other government 
entities provide certain public health functions (e.g., environmental health, emergency 
medical, mental health, and/or substance abuse services) in close association with the 
LHD.  Ultimately, however, it is the LHD that is responsible  -whether as leader, 
supervisor, convener, partner, collaborator, enabler, or evaluator-  for delivery of a 
cohesive local public health system.   
    
There are basically three general structures by which states manage public health 
delivery:   
• Decentralized (31 states)  -where all LHDs are run by the local municipal 
government 
• Centralized (7 states)  -where either all LHDs are run by the state or there are no 
local entities (Rhode Island), where the state provides all local services 
• Mixed (12 states)  -where some LHDs are run by the s ate and some by the local 
government  
Nearly 80% of LHDs are units of local government (i.e., county, city, town), while the 
rest are units of the state health agency.  3 
 
Because of the predominance of county government in America and its role as a 
convenient vehicle for down-streaming responsibilites to the local level, some 83 percent  
of the nation’s LHDs serve county, multi-county, or city-county jurisdictions; the rest 
serve towns and cities.  4 Because of their relatively large budgets, city health 
departments often have a wider array of programs and services than their county 
equivalents.   
 
 
The Massachusetts Public Health Structure: 
In much of New England, county government is notoriusly weak and, for all intents and 
purposes, non-existent.  This is certainly true in Massachusetts, where the main function 
of its 12 counties is managing corrections facilities, courts, and registries of deeds, and, in 
some instances, public hospitals and/or golf courses.  In contrast, the state’s town and city 
government organization is particularly strong.  This “ ome rule” bias reflects a long-
standing belief that local matters should be handled at the lowest common political 
denominator by officials familiar with local conditions.  Accordingly, state statute 
mandates that every city and town have its own healt  department responsible for 
enforcing state sanitary and environmental codes, adopting reasonable local health 
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ordinances, and carrying out preventive programs. 5  Backing statute is a significant body 
of case law plus a host of local regulations.  Meanwhile, the primary functions of the state 
department of public health are dispersing emergency preparedness funds, promulgating 
health-related regulations, and, when necessary, declaring a state of emergency.       
 
As a result, this single state with little more than 2 percent of the nation’s total population 
accounts for nearly 12 percent of its LHDs.  Expressed geographically, the average 
Massachusetts LHD covers an area of 30 square miles, compared to the 1,250 square 
miles covered by each of the nation’s 3,000 LHDs.  In terms of population served, each 
of Massachusetts’s 351 LHDs serves an average of 18,500 people, compared to the 
approximately 100,000 people served by each of the nation’s local health departments.    
 
The development of public health policy, the delivery of related services, and the quality 
of those services vary widely throughout Massachusetts.  As one might expect, LHDs 
anchored by major cities benefit from economies of cale and larger resources.  By 
contrast, the outliers suffer staff and funding constraints that restrict their main activities 
to the most basic sanitation and housing services.  The result is a fragmented state-wide 
public health system where, as one state report has noted:   
               …there is no single view of the appropriate roles and responsibilities  
              of local…health [organizations]….[E]ach…has its own particular 
              set of responsibilities and ways of ding business, responding to widely 
              variable perceptions about public healt  priorities among local officials, 
              health professionals, and community residents who appear selectively 
              aware of public health issues depending principally on how these issues 
              affect the directly…[Likewise, the] data…show wide variability statewide 
              in the governance, composition, respon ibilities, staffing, and financing of 
              local…health [organizations]…  6  
Illustratively, boards may be elected or appointed, while some communities appoint a 
commissioner of health who is then advised by an appointed committee of residents; 
other municipalities ask their selectmen to fill the duties of a board of health.  Board 
members are typically volunteer citizens with their own full-time jobs; some of them are 
healthcare professionals, but many are not; membership turnover is high.  For towns large 
enough to have a health department, staff may be voluntary (typically board of health 
members) or paid; full- or part-time; with or without formal training in public health.  
The state’s largest cities are able to support complex city health departments with 
hundreds (even thousands) of employees, many with highly specialized skills.  Further 
complicating the consistency of state-wide public health delivery, Massachusetts is one of 
the few states with no state-wide credentialing requir ment for its local health officials.    
 
Most public health funding comes from local tax revenues and fees.  However, as newly 
mandated obligations and responsibilities have been assigned (e.g., septic system 
regulations, and tobacco education and enforcement programs) without any 
commensurate increases in funding, budgets have become increasingly tight.  LHDs 
compete with local school, fire, and police departments for limited and frequently 
diminished resources.  Further constricting the ability of local government is the 1980 
law that limits to 2 ½ percent the annual increase in a community’s tax levy (absent a 
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voter override).  Since so many municipalities are too small to provide a full range of 
public health services, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health purchases many  
such services from some 700 “vendors”   -private contractors, community-based 
organizations (e.g., visiting nurse associations), and agencies (e.g., local department or 
public works)   -that competitively bid for contracts.  The contracts range from substance 
abuse programs to routine sanitation inspections, immunizations, school health services, 
nursing services, health education programs, well-being clinics, and home hazardous 
waste disposal.   
 
One of the most basic yet important pubic health functions is inspecting and licensing 
restaurants and other food service establishments.  A just released and highly critical 
report by the state auditor finds that Massachusetts’  balkanized approach has put its 
residents at serious risk of: 
              evolving disease pathogens and potential bio-terrorism activity [because] 
              inspection and other food protection activities…are not conducted with 
              adequate frequency, quality, standardiz tion, coordination, or oversight… 
              The Commonwealth’s highly decentralized system, operated by generally 
              small town…health authorities with minimal oversight, coordination, or 
              technical assistance from state governm nt has been characterized by the 
              FDA [Food & Drug Administration] as “unique” in the nation and has 
              presented concerns to federal food prtection officials at least as far back 
              as 1982…[F]ood protection and other loca  health authority activities should 
              be restructured using a regionalization approach. 7  
                        
Based on a series of off-the-record discussions and interviews with public health 
representatives from across the state, the most critical issues facing the state’s  
fragmented public health system may be summarized as follows:    
• staffing  -i.e., no minimal staff credentialing, training, or size requirements; 
• standards  -i.e., no “best practices” model to be shared at local, regional, or  state 
levels 
• size  -i.e., too many small, under-staffed, under-funded LHDs unable to ensure 
minimal public health services in their particular serving area 
• growing expectations (e.g., emergency preparedness, pandemics, natural 
disasters) but no increases in funding    
• leadership  -i.e., no state-wide vision (with public health delivery largely an ad 
hoc response to individual crises rather than a proctive, systematized 
undertaking)   
 
 
Benefits of Consolidation: 
The National Association of County & City Health Officials (“NACCHO”) has analyzed 
the effectiveness of public health infrastructures.  The following table, based on 
NACCHO’s survey data, differentiates, on a percentage basis, a broad sampling of 
services provided by county, city, city-county, and town-based health agencies.  The 
conclusion is quite overwhelming:  LHDs serving larger population bases provide more 









             Table 1:  Percent of Services Provided by Local Public Health Departments: 
 
                   Service:                          County:   City:    City-      Town:     Multi- 
                                                                                  County                  County 
 
     Childhood Immunizations                  98%     88%     99%         45%       93% 
     Cancer Screenings                             65       41         69            22          74 
     Cardiovascular Screenings                 53      53         39            28          68 
     Diabetes Screenings                           63       44        59             33         66 
     Blood Pressure Screenings                 86      82         85            55          81  
     Community Assessment                    86       75         85            52          87 
     Community Outreach & Education   94         89         95            62          95 
     Communicable Disease Control        99        89        98            68        100 
     Epidemiology & Surveillance            88     80         85            56         92 
     Family Planning                               72         36         56              9         70
     Maternal Health                                 80         60         71             24        88
     Prenatal Care                                      45         34         54            18        59
     HIV/AIDS Testing & Counsel           80         43         73            11         72 
     STD Testing & Counsel                     80       60         76              6         69 
     Tuberculosis Testing                          96        87         99            45         90  
     Tuberculosis Treatment                      85         48         90            17         71 
Source: National Association of County & City Health Officials, Local Public Health Agency 
Infrastructure: A Chartbook (October 2001): 26-35.  http://archive.naccho.org/documents/chartbook.html. 
(accessed March 18, 2007)    
 
The study also examines LHD workforce trends and fis, not surprisingly, that town 
LHDs have significantly smaller staffs, have more difficulty in attracting and retaining 
qualified staff, are less able to provide regular st ff training, and have more budget 
constraints than their larger counterparts. 8   
 
NACCHO is not alone in concluding that the performance of relatively small public 
health delivery units suffers vis-à-vis that of their larger counterparts.  Turnock notes  
that, “Several reports going back more than 50 years h ve proposed extensive 
consolidation of small LHDs because of perceived lack of efficiency and coordination of 
services, inconsistent administration of public health l ws, and inability of small LHDs to 
raise adequate resources to carry out their prime functions effectively.” 9   In their study  
of public health performance, Mays et al stress that:
         Large public health systems may be able to r alize economies of scale…by  
         spreading the fixed costs over larger populations of beneficiaries and taxpayers. 
         Large public health systems may also benefit from larger pools of organizations 
         in the community that may be enlisted to participate in public health activities… 
 9 
         Several previous studies have found evidence that larger public health systems 
         perform better than their counterparts in carrying out activities considered to be 
         important elements of public health practice. 10            
 
In view of the role of size in the delivery of public health, the issue for Massachusetts is 
how it might best restructure its heavily fragmented public health system into a more 
regionalized system.  In contrast to the formal administrative or political structure of a 
town or county, a “region” would be a geographic entity comprising multiple towns that 
come together to facilitate the provision of services to the combined populations.  Such a 
regional system would allow the fixed costs of public health infrastructure to be spread 
over a larger population and tax base than possible with a single town.  The benefits 
would presumably be economies of scale, an expanded range of health services, and more 
timely and efficient delivery.   
 
  
Some Relevant Local Experience with Regionalization: 
Notwithstanding its strong tradition of local autonomy and its highly fragmented 
approach to public health, Massachusetts has had some experience with “regional” 
approaches to healthcare.  These include several multi-community collaborations 
established (but no longer funded) to implement state-wide tobacco control initiatives.  
More recent has been the creation of five emergency preparedness districts to manage the 
distribution of federal funds made available post-9/11.  There are also three other 
prototypes, potentially more relevant, at least in terms of their broader-based public 
health functionality.   
 
The longest standing is the Nashoba Associated Boards of Health (“NABH”), created in 
1931 under provisions of state statute permitting two or more towns to formally join 
together into regional health districts to provide health services. 11  Fourteen 
municipalities located in the central part of the state, cutting across two counties, and 
accounting for some 90,000 people collectively use NABH as “agent” to assist their 
elected boards of health in performing their respectiv  functions.  The individual health 
boards retain autonomy, while Nashoba provides a wide range of public health services.  
The agency and its 175 employees are funded by a combination of member town 
assessments and user fees.  
 
A different form of collaboration is the state’s only county-wide health department, 
created in 1926 in Barnstable County, comprising the 15 towns located on Cape Cod, 
representing some 200,000 year-round residents (and three-times more in the summer).  
Like every other municipality in the state, each of Barnstable’s towns has its own LHD.  
But in an arrangement that is unique in the state, he towns also share a county health 
commissioner and staff, which provide supplemental, ad hoc advisory and support 
services to the local communities on an as-needed basis.  Overall funding is provided 
through a 1 percent county sales tax.      
 
A third type of collaboration is the Franklin Regional Council of Governments 
(“FRCOG”), a voluntary association of 26 municipalities in the western part of the state  
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covering approximately 10% of the state’s land mass and some 70,000 people.  To help 
the LHDs of member towns perform their normal range of public health functions, the 
towns hire FRCOG’s regional health agent on an hourly basis.  Expenses are covered by 
a combination of user fees and town assessments.          
 
Encouraging as they are, these collaborations collectively involve only about 5 percent of 
the state’s 6.5 million residents living in fewer than one-fifth of its towns.  Obviously 
these prototypes need significant enlargement if they are to form the basis of any 
meaningful state-wide regionalization scheme. 
 
 
Potential Regionalization Models for Massachusetts:  
There are at least four factors any effort to regionalize will need to keep in mind.     
First is the matter of size.  Despite their advocacy of large health systems, Mays 
et al also found, “the performance improvements to be gained from 
consolidation…diminish with size, with further gains appearing unlikely beyond 
a threshold of approximately 500,000 residents.”  12   Second, creating regional 
structures will be threatening to the many hundreds of dedicated and hard-
working public health employees who serve the state’s 351 LHDs.  Most 
recognize the obvious short-comings of the current fragmented system, but they 
are also fearful for their jobs; their buy-in will be vital to any successful 
transition to regionalization.   
 
Third, convincing towns to integrate public health delivery structures will be far 
easier if long-standing traditions of local autonomy are respected.  Otherwise,  
staunch grass roots resistance is likely to thwart the effort.  Finally, it will be 
necessary to avoid a “one model fits all” mindset.  Different types of mini-
regions are already at work, and there is no reason to adopt one model and 
discard the others.  Indeed, it would probably be wise to keep all of the  
functioning mini-regions in tact and either duplicate them elsewhere and/or 
create other types of regions.         
 
As noted earlier, LHDs are most typically county-based.  Besides Massachusetts, 
however, there are some notable exceptions, including Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
New Jersey.  Like Massachusetts, each has a long tradition of home rule and, thus, a 
highly decentralized public health system.  All have similar socio-economic and 
geopolitical structures:  a few large, relatively more prosperous metropolitan areas, with 
the rest of the population residing in smaller, usually rural, often widely scattered and 
often much poorer towns.  For many of the same reasons that make regionalization a 
logical next step for Massachusetts, each of these stat s has begun in recent years to 
move toward regionalized public health structures.  Their experiences are worth noting.          
   
New Hampshire:  The impetus for a more regional approach to public health in New 
Hampshire was a grant provided by The Robert Wood Jhnson and the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundations.  Its aim was to integrate local and state government with that of non-
governmental organizations like community health centers, hospitals, and social service 
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organizations.  Funding and technical assistance was initially provided to four groups, or 
“coalitions,” covering 37 of the state’s towns.  Bycombining the diverse expertise of 
members, the focus of these coalitions has been to overcome local parochialism and 
foster collaborations.     
 
Although the grant funding has ended, the process and importance of partnering among 
towns as well as other entities has gained increased state-wide acceptance, thanks to the 
reality of limited local budgets, a growing appreciation of the efficiencies to be realized 
through working together, and a state statute (similar to that in Massachusetts) allowing 
local governments to form multi-town, or “district,” health departments.   An additional 
impetus has been the need to comply with federal emergency preparedness requirements.  
Mainly by trial and error  -trying to integrate school overlay districts, vaccination 
distribution districts, and emergency preparedness districts  -10 quasi-health districts 
have been created, each focusing on prevention planing.  Although still nascent, state 
health officials are optimistic about the prospects for state-wide regionalization.   
 
New Jersey: A task force funded a few years ago by The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (“RWJF”) called New Jersey’s public health system  -comprising 566 cities 
and towns as well as some 250 LHDs  -“antiquated, outdated and ill-equipped to respond 
to 21st century imperative,” criticizing it as one that “compromises efforts to provide 
responsive and effective outreach, education and health services.”  It went on to 
recommend the town-based system be restructured into “coherent geographic entities” 
able to provide more effective “reporting and responsiveness, consumer information 
resources, training, and…services” able to meet both unanticipated emergencies as well 
as ongoing health matters.  13    
 
Prompted by the RWJF and then propelled by the events of 9/11, the state has actively 
pursued policies aimed at consolidating LHDs and establi hing state-wide practice 
standards.  The cornerstone has been the creation by the state health department of 
agencies, or “links,” in each county to coordinate public health preparedness and 
planning.  An important part of this effort has been the recognition of the key role played 
by LHDs in the delivery of the more traditional public health services, for example, 
inspections and blood pressure screenings.  Meanwhile, “ ealth partnerships” have been 
established within each county to provide a formal echanism for convening local health 
officers, the major purpose being to encourage collab rations in compliance with newly 
established practice standards that emphasize the central role of integrated LHDs.  14                        
 
Connecticut:  Like both Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Connecticut statute allows 
formation of multi-town, or district, health districts.  For the past four decades, as a 
means of enhancing the quality and delivery consistency of its public health services 
through standardization and economies of scale, the stat  has actively encouraged the 
creation of these health districts.  Post 9/11 concerns about the threat of bioterrorism have 
added a new urgency to the effort.  A key tool has been the use of financial incentives, 
namely the annual allocation in state funds of approximately $2 per capita to towns 
joining with others into health districts.  To-date, some three-quarters of all municipalities 
have joined into 19 separate health districts, ranging in size from two to 19 towns.  The 
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process continues, and officials anticipate there bing a total of some 30 districts within 
the next two decades.     
 
     
Conclusion: 
The paradigm has clearly shifted in New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Connecticut, 
where concerted efforts are being made to marry the autonomy of local public health 
delivery capacities with the advantages of greater coo dination and synergy among 
combined local agencies.  Financial incentives have played a key role.  Notwithstanding 
the progress that has been made in all three, the pat  in each has been complicated and 
delayed by the inevitable realities of funding shortages, personal political agendas, “not 
invented here” reactions, and a host of other bureaucratic hindrances.  But the positive 
progress in these three traditional home rule state provides positive example to 
Massachusetts that a meaningful transition to a less balkanized, more holistic approach to 
public health is possible.   
 
Any viable Massachusetts-wide regional structure will need to be multi-faceted and 
eclectic, reflecting geopolitical and socio-economic divisions as well as the various 
regional schemes already in existence.  The Nashoba, Barnstable, and Franklin 
collaborations are each providing a useful range of public health services throughout their 
respective serving areas; other towns might be added to ach as a means of further 
leveraging economies of scale.  The public health system of Boston (population 600,000) 
is an already existing and viable operation, and several other urban centers could form the 
anchor around which other regional clusters might be structured.  Examples include such 
geopolitical centers as Cambridge, Lowell, Springfield, and Worcester (populations in the 
100,000 – 200,000 range), most or all of which have strong public health departments of 
their own as well as broad networks of public and private health care providers, law 
enforcement and public safety communities, and educational institutions.  Finally, the 
emergency preparedness regions could provide an overlay for a few additional public 
health region regions.   
 
Ultimately, making public health delivery more effective and efficient in Massachusetts 
will entail more than negotiating and setting up regions across the state.  Empowering 
each region with the wherewithal to deliver a full range of public health services will 
require addressing some fundamentally basic and still unresolved operating issues, 
including:  
• Staffing and training: how does the state move from a heavily volunteer structure 
to one with a greater degree of professional training and accreditation, especially 
in the more rural and less prosperous towns of the central and western state?  
• Funding: what combination of local assessment, fee-based revenue, state funding, 
Connecticut-type incentives, and federal grants is appropriate and sufficient to 
ensure the broadest possible delivery capability?   
• Services: should each region have the capacity to provide all of the same core  
services, or will some inter-regional sharing be appro riate? 
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The process of regionalization will be neither easy nor quick.  But there can be little 
doubt that Massachusetts is long overdue in providing its citizens a first-rate public health 
system.  And the timing may be opportune  -rising concerns about global bio-terrorism, 
potential pandemic outbreaks, and/or fears of a Katrina-type natural disaster now have 
the added momentum of a newly elected governor, a newly appointed state public health 
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